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Abstract 
We introduce Game networks ( G  nets), a 
novel representation for multi-agent decision 
problems. Compared to other game-theoretic 
representations, such as strategic or extensive 
forms, G nets are more structured and more 
compact; more fundamentally, G nets consti­
tute a computationally advantageous frame­
work for strategic inference, as both prob­
ability and utility independencies are cap­
tured in the structure of the network and can 
be exploited in order to simplify the infer­
ence process. An important aspect of multi­
agent reasoning is the identification of some 
or all of the strategic equilibria in a game; 
we present original convergence methods for 
strategic equilibrium which can take advan­
tage of strategic separabilities in the G net 
structure in order to simplify the computa­
tions. Specifically, we describe a method 
which identifies a unique equilibrium as a 
function of the game payoffs, and one which 
identifies all equilibria. 
1 Introduction 
The formal analysis of multi-agent systems is a topic 
of interest to both economic theory and artificial intel­
ligence. While game-theoretic notions and method­
ologies have already populated the economic main­
stream, only recently they started to attract interest in 
the context of artificial intelligence, where their inte­
gration with existing methods constitutes a promising 
area of new research. 
In this paper we introduce a new class of graphical rep­
resentations for multi-agent decision problems, Game 
networks ( G  nets). Compared to standard game­
theoretic representations, such as strategic and exten­
sive forms, G nets are more structured and more com-
pact, as both probabilities and utilities enjoy a mod­
ular representation. More fundamentally, G nets pro­
vide a computationally advantageous framework for 
strategic inference, as one can exploit conditional prob­
ability and utility independencies to reduce the com­
plexity of the inference process. 
An important aspect of multi-agent reasoning is the 
identification of some or all of the strategic equilibria 
in a game. For all but the simplest classes of games 
this a computationally demanding task, which can in 
principle be alleviated by making more efficient use of 
the information contained in the game structure (see 
[ M M96] for a survey on the recent state of the art 
on the computation of strategic equilibria). We de­
rive original convergence methods for strategic equi­
librium which can exploit strategic separabilities in 
the G net representation in order to simplify computa­
tions. Specifically, we describe a path-tracking method 
which identifies a unique equilibrium as a function of 
the game payoffs, and one which identifies all equilib­
ria. 
G nets are closely related to a novel representation 
for single-agent decision problems, Expected Utility 
networks ( E U  nets), introduced in [ L M S99]. E U  nets 
generalize Markovian networks from the AI literature 
[ Pea88], and provide a modular and compact frame­
work for strategic inference. 
E U  nets exploit a novel notion of utility independence, 
closely related to its probabilistic counterpart. To­
gether, conditional probability and utility indepen­
dence imply conditional expected utility (or strate­
gic) independence. What is important about strate­
gically independent decisions is that they can be effec­
tively decentralized: a single, complicated agent can 
be replaced by simpler, conditionally independent sub­
agents, who can do just as well. This property is of 
interest not only to artificial intelligence, since it can 
be exploited to reduce the complexity of planning, but 
also to economic theory, as it suggests a principled way 
for the identification of optimal task allocations within 
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economic organizations. 
Yet, E U  nets are somewhat limited for the purpose 
of modeling, as they do not capture causal relation­
ships among events. Obviating to such limitation is a 
primary motivation for the introduction of G nets. 
Game networks stand in roughly the same relationship 
to Bayesian networks as Expected Utility networks to 
Markovian networks. Bayesian networks encompass 
a probabilistic notion of causality, whereas the causal 
"parents" of each variable in the network are assumed 
to determine its conditional probability, but not its 
truth value. While the resulting implicit represen­
tation of the state space affords significant computa­
tional advantages, it still captures all the relevant in­
formation for the purpose of Bayesian inference, and 
provides an intuitive and compact modeling frame­
work. Moreover , the probabilistic independencies cap­
tured by the network structure can be exploited to 
simplify the inference process, either directly or by first 
passing to a Markovian representation. 
G nets encompass a decision-theoretic notion of causal­
ity, Bayesian rationality, whereas the agents' prefer­
ences constrain the conditional probabilities of the pos­
sible actions, but not their truth values. We argue that 
Bayesian rationality captures all the relevant informa­
tion for the purpose of strategic inference, while at the 
same time avoiding some difficulties faced by other no­
tions of causality. As in the case of Bayesian networks, 
one can either perform strategic inference directly on 
a G net, or switch to a (multi-agent) E U  net represen­
tation first. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 
2 we briefly present the decision-theoretic background 
of G nets. In section 3 we give a formal definition of 
G nets, and discuss how they can be used to model 
multi-agent decision problems in the context of a sim­
ple example. F inally, in section 4 we give existence 
and convergence results for strategic equilibrium in G 
nets. 
2 Decision-theoretic preliminaries 
In this section we present the decision-theoretic back­
ground of G nets; we first give a brief summary of 
the framework developed in [ L M S98], and then discuss 
how to incorporate an appropriate notion of causality 
within the framework. 
Let A be a Boolean algebra of events (or propositions), 
and !:::; a preference ordering on the nonempty events 
A-{0}. Without loss of generality, we extend!:::; to the 
entire algebra A by assuming E >- 0 for all nonempty 
EEA. 
We now define what it means for a preference ordering 
!:::; to admit an expected utility representation. 
Definition 1 An expected utility representation of!:::; 
on A is a pair (P, U), where P : A---+ [0, 1] is a prob­
ability function and U : A ---+ JR+ is a non-negative 
utility function such that: 
1. U(E) � U(F) if and only if E!:::; F 
2. U(E)P(E) = Lk U(Ek)P(Ek) for any finite, 
measurable partition { Ek} of E. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the utility 
of the empty set is zero. 
Example 1 Let b. be the set of all probability mea­
sures defined on a finite algebra A, and let !:::; be a pref­
erence ordering on b. which admits a von Neumann­
Morgenstern expected utility representation. Let P E 
b. be a given, strictly positive probability measure 
representing the agent's prior beliefs, and for all 
nonempty E E A let PE be the conditional measure 
defined by PE(F) = P(E n F)/ F(E), F E A. Pref­
erences over posterior probabilities { PE } can be iden­
tified with preferences over nonempty events in A by 
imposing E !:::; F if and only if PE !:::; PF. Then the 
resulting preference ordering on A admits an expected 
utility representation in our sense. 
We say that a family {PEhEA-{0} is a conditional 
probability system if it assigns to every non-empty con­
ditioning event E E A a conditional probability mea­
sure over AnE, such that the PE agree with Bayesian 
conditioning whenever possible; specifically, for any 
nonempty E, F, G E A such that G C F C E, one 
has that PE(G) = PE(F)pF(G). 
Definition 2 A conditional expected utility repre­
sentation of !:::; on A is a pair (p, u) , where p := 
{PEhEA-{0} is a conditional probability system and 
u : A ---+ JR+ is a non-negative utility junction such 
that: 
• u(E) � u(F) if and only if E !:::; F 
• u(E) = Z:::: u(Ek) PE(Ek) for any finite, measur­
able partition {Ek} of E. 
Let I be a finite set of agents. Agent i E I is assumed 
to have preferences not only about the basic events 
in a finite algebra Ao and its own preferences, but on 
other agents' preferences as well. 
Let W be a set of possible worlds, and !:::;� a function 
which associates to each pair (i, w) a preference order­
ing on zw. For any E, F E A0, let [E >-iF] denote the 
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proposition {wE W I  E >-� F} ("i (strictly ) prefers E 
to F"), and by [E ,..,_,i F] the set {wE W I  E rv� F} 
(" i is indifferent between E and F"). Furthermore, let 
Bb denote the set of all finite intersections of proposi­
tions [E >-iF] and [E ,..,_,iF]. 
We recursively define n-th order (n > 0) algebras and 
preferences: 
• An= An-1 U (UiEIB�_1) is the algebra generated 
by events in An-1 and 8�_1, i E I 
• B� ( i E I) is the set of all finite intersections of 
propositions [E >-i F], [E ,..,_,i F], where E, F E 
An 
• A = UnAn is the algebra generated by events 
E E An (n � 0), and Bi is the set of all finite 
intersections of propositions [E >-i F], [E ,..,_,i F], 
where E, FE A. 
Notice that Bi C A, and hence A = AU (UiEIBi). 
Therefore, further iteration is superfluous: all the pref­
erences on events in A are already included in A. 
Under regularity conditions described in [LMS98] 
there exists an expected utility representation of agent 
i's preferences on events in An, for all finite n and for 
all i E I, which satisfies 
for any finite, An-measurable partition {Ek} of E. Ob­
serve that, since here probabilities and utilities emerge 
purely as expressions of preferences, statements about 
(unobservable, but strategically relevant ) probabilities 
and utilities can be made sense of as statements about 
preferences (observable, at least in principle ). Also, 
statements about higher-order probabilities and utili­
ties (such as "I believe that you consider E more likely 
than F", or "I would like you to believe F" , etc., 
also useful when carrying out explicit strategic reason­
ing ) can be similarly interpreted as statements about 
higher-order preferences. 
Furthermore, under additional regularity conditions, 
for all i E I there exists a conditional expected utility 
representation of t on A which satisfies 
for all (E, F) E Ax Bi, and for any finite, measurable 
partition { Ek} of E. 1 
1 For a precise statement of the result and for proofs see 
(LM99]. 
So far the representation does not involve any notion 
of causality: in other words, nothing links the agents' 
preferences on events with the actual occurrence of 
those events. To bring causality into the picture we 
first assume that the set of basic events Ao is the 
Boolean algebra generated by the available moves in 
an extensive form game. For each information set H 
in the extensive form, let { E H} be the partition gen­
erated by the available moves at H. We shall refer to 
the EH as optional events, or actions. 
We could now assume that, for any information set H 
associated to agent i, and for any EH and FH which 
are available actions at H, EH >-i FH implies FH = 0; 
in other words, we could regard any action which is not 
the most preferred by the agent at the corresponding 
information set as impossible. One problem with this 
approach is that all dominated actions, being impossi­
ble, must be indifferent to each other. In other words, 
for no three actions EH, FH, G H can it be the case that 
EH >-i FH >-i GH. This naive treatment of causality 
leads to significant difficulties when reasoning about 
weakly dominated strategies, as the latter cannot be 
regarded as disbelieved yet possible events. 
We avoid this problem by adopting a probabilistic no­
tion of causality. In this view, all optional events are 
possible; the notion of possibility logically precedes 
the agents' decisions, and is part of the description 
of the game. In particular, this will allow us to regard 
a prisoner's dilemma, where cooperation is indeed an 
available action, as logically distinct from a degenerate 
game in which the two players have no choice at all. 
The following property links preferences to actions; 
for any two actions EH, FH available to agent i at 
H, EH >-i FH implies PH(FH) = 0. The interpre­
tation of this assumption, which we shall refer to as 
Bayesian rationality, is that agents do not directly as­
sign the truth values of optional events; rather, their 
preferences constrain the conditional probabilities of 
the possible actions in such a way that the probabil­
ity of any dominated action is equal to zero. Intu­
itively, we are assuming that the agents' decisions may 
be prone to occasional mistakes, but the likelihood of 
any such mistake is infinitesimal. 
3 Game Networks 
There are two standard representations for mathemat­
ical games: the normal (or strategic ) form, and the 
extensive form. The extensive form is more structured 
than the normal form: not only it describes the iden­
tities of the players, the strategies available to each 
player, and the payoff functions, as the normal form 
does; but also the information held by the agents at 
any possible state of the system, and the causal struc-
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ture of events in the game. The extensive form is at 
least as general as the normal form: any game in nor­
mal form can be interpreted as a game with simulta­
neous moves, and represented in the extensive form. 
The reverse operation (from the extensive to the nor­
mal form) is also possible, but some of the structural 
information is lost in the process, and hence the result­
ing normal-form representation is often impractically 
large. 
Even though extensive-form representations are more 
compact than normal-form ones, they may still be 
quite redundant: often, in concrete examples, differ­
ent end nodes may have identical payoffs, and the 
same actions may be available at different informa­
tion sets, but the recognition of those symmetries does 
not lead to a more parsimonious representation. Fur­
thermore, changing a few details in the setup usually 
entails rewriting the whole game; in other words, the 
extensive-form representation is not particularly mod­
ular. As we shall see, compared to extensive forms G 
nets are at least as general, but more structured and 
more compact. 
In order to formally define G nets we need some 
more notation, which we borrow from [ L M S99]. Let 
{Xk}kEN be a set of variables, and for any M C N let 
XM := XkEMXk. Let u: XN---+ IR+ be a strictly posi­
tive utility function, and let {A, B, C} be a partition of 
N; also, define -A:= BUC. F inally, let w(xAIX-A) = 
u(xA, X-A)/u(x�, X-A), where x0 E XN is an arbi­
trary reference point; w(xAIX-A) is called the utility 
potential at XA, and captures how the utility changes 
when the variables in A shift away from the reference 
point, while the values of the remaning variables are 
held fixed at X-A· If, for all (xA, X-A) , the value of 
w(xAIX-A) only depends on xc, and not on XB, we say 
that XA is u-independent of XB given Xc, and define 
new quantities w(xAJxc) := w(xAJx�,xc). If XA and 
XB are both probabilistically and u-independent given 
Xc then we say that they are strategically independent 
given Xc. 
3.1 A formal definition 
G nets are comprised of a finite, ordered set of nodes 
XN (where N = {1, . .  ,n}), corresponding to a set of 
strategically relevant variables which we also assume to 
be finitely-valued, a partition I of N which determines 
the identity of the agent responsible for the decision at 
each node2 (including Nature), and two types of arc, 
representing causal and preferential (teleological) de-
2For simplicity, we assume that all the actions available 
at node k pertain to the same player i(k), although this 
assumption can be relaxed. In fact, our treatment carries 
over without changes if we assume that different agents are 
active at different information sets of the same node. 
pendencies. Causal dependencies are represented by 
directed (probability) arcs, with no cycles, and prefer­
ential dependencies by undirected (utility) arcs. 
A node Xk (k E N) is associated with two quantities, 
w ( xk iXuN(k)  and p(xklxPF(k)), where UN(k) are the 
nodes directly connected to Xk via utility arcs (the 
utility neighbors of X k), and P F ( k) is the set of prob­
ability parents 3 of xk. While the p(xkiXPF(k)) iden­
tify a conditional probability system, the same for all 
players, w is a vector of functions ( wi). 1, one for each zE 
player. In turn, the wi ( xk lxuN(k ) are interpreted as 
the utility potentials coming from some strictly posi­
tive utility finction ui. 
The incoming probability arcs represent those events 
which the agent who controls Xk can observe at the 
moment of decision. A decision-maker (including Na­
ture) may choose any random rule, as long as it de­
pends on the truth values of the XPF(k) only. An 
element of the partition generated by the XPF(k) is 
called an information set at k, and represents all the 
information available to the agent at the moment of 
decision. 
We say that payoffs are normal if the utilities of all 
states are positive, and are expressed as multiples 
of u i(x0) (where x0 is the arbitrary reference point). 
Clearly, any game can be transformed in one with nor­
mal payoffs via a suitable positive affine rescaling of 
the original payoffs. Hence, without loss of generality, 
we shall concentrate on games with normal payoffs. 
A G net in which only the probabilities of Nature 's ac­
tions (and not those of the other agents') are specified 
is a G frame. A G frame can be regarded as the set 
of all G nets which respect the implied independence 
structure, and agree in the utility assignments and in 
the probabilities of Nature 's actions. 
Theorem 1 Any finite game in extensive form has a 
G frame representation. 
Let Ai(H) be the set of actions available to player i 
at an information set H. Ai(H) can be regarded as a 
partition of H into possible actions EH. 
Definition 3 A Game network is said to satisfy 
Bayesian rationality if, for all k E N, for all informa­
tion sets H = XPF(k), and for any EH, FH E Ai(k) ( H) , 
it is the case that ui (k) ( EH JH) > ui(k)(FHJH) implies 
PH(FH) = 0. 
Anticipating our discussion on the existence of strate­
gic equilibrium in game networks, we state the follow-
3The probability parents of a node Xk are those nodes 
which are immediate predecessors of Xk in the partial or­
dering induced by the (directed) probability arcs. 
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ing important corollary. 
Corollary 2 For any finite G frame there exists a 
corresponding G net which satisfies Bayesian rational­
ity . 
3.2 An example: the beer/quiche game 
As an example of G net we present the beer /quiche 
game. In this game, Nature selects the type of player 
1, who may be either strong ( S ) or weak (- S ). Player 1 
(who knows his type ) goes to a pub, and has to decide 
whether to get beer (B ) or quiche (- B ). His decisions 
are observed by player 2, who is a bully and, as such, 
enjoys fighting against weak types. After observing 
what player 1 orders, player 2 decides whether to start 
a fight with player 1 ( F ) or not (- F ). If player 1 is 
strong he will fight back, and hence player 2 in that 
case prefers not to fight. Player 1 always prefers not 
to get into a fight, but more strongly so if he is a weak 
type and hence knows that he would be beaten up. 
Finally, strong types of player 1 prefer beer to quiche, 
while weak types have the opposite preference. 
A G net (or, more precisely, a G frame ) representation 
of this game is depicted in figure 1, along with the cor­
responding extensive-form representation. The prob­
ability dependencies are represented by solid arrows, 
while the dashed and dotted lines represent utility de­
pendencies for players 1 and 2 respectively. 
p(S)-0.9 
w(S.BI·F)-1 
w,(SI-F)-1 
w1(BIS)=3/2 
w,(BI-5)"2/3 
(3, 4) 
(12, 2) 
(4. I) 
(8, 2) 
F 
-F 
···-:::, 
··· .... 
-B 
-S 
s 
-B 
w1(FIS)=112 
w,(FI-5)=1/4 
F w,(FIS)=112 
w2(F�S)=2 
B 
0.1 
0.9 
B 
reference point: -S,-B,-F 
payoffs - utility relative to 
referenoe point, times 12. 
F (2, 4) 
-F (8, 2) 
(6, 1) 
(12, 2) 
F igure 1: The beer / quiche game. 
In the informal description above are buried several in­
dependence assumptions. For instance, it is implicitly 
assumed that Nature's choice cannot depend on what 
the two players will do later, or that player 2's decision 
contingent on the observation of player 1 's behavior is 
independent of Nature's choice. Moreover, it is im­
plicitly assumed that player 1 prefers beer or quiche 
regardless of whether he will have to fight or not, or 
that player 2 only cares about 1 's type if he chooses to 
fight, but not otherwise. 
In the G net representation, both probability and util­
ity independencies are captured in the structure of the 
network. By contrast, the extensive form only cap­
tures probability independencies, while the recognition 
of utility independencies (which induce symmetries in 
the payoff structure ) does not lead to a more compact 
representation. In our example, compactness is also 
reflected in the number of parameters needed to spec­
ify the game payoffs: in the extensive form one needs 
16 parameters to identify the payoffs, while in the G 
net representation one only needs 8. 
Compactness is only one of several advantages of G 
nets over extensive forms; another one is modularity. 
For instance, in a G net one can easily introduce new 
moves (e.g., the reaction of a third player to player 2's 
decision to fight or not ), or change the informational 
assumptions while at the same time retaining most of 
the existing structure (in particular, payoffs do not 
need to be completely reassessed if the state space is 
refined ). 
A third advantageous feature of G nets is that the rele­
vant information about utilities can generally be intro­
duced more naturally than in extensive forms. In the 
context of our example, for instance, going from the in­
formal description to a numeric assessment of the pay­
offs is relatively cumbersome; the decision maker needs 
to report absolute utility values for all possible out­
comes, while the informal description only compares 
a few different scenarios. By contrast, to construct a 
G net one only needs information about payoff depen­
dencies and order-of-magnitude comparisons between 
the relative utilities of alternative scenarios, which is 
closely related to the type of information contained in 
the informal description. 
4 Strategic equilibrium in game 
networks 
An important aspect of multi-agent reasoning is the 
identification of some or all of the strategic equilibria 
in a game. In this section we establish convergence re­
sults for strategic equilibrium which can exploit strate­
gic separabilities in the G net representation in order 
to simplify the computation of equilibria. Specifically, 
we describe a path-tracking method which identifies a 
unique equilibrium as a function of the game payoffs, 
and one which identifies all equilibria. 
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Let X be a finite set of states, and let A be a Boolean 
algebra of subsets of X. 
We assume that the agent's preferences on A admit 
a conditional expected utility representation (p, u), 
where p is a conditional probability system defined on 
A, and u is a function associating to each state x a 
positive real number u(x). 
The expected utility and conditional expected utility 
for general events are defined by 
u(p)(E) := L u(x)p(xiE), and 
X 
u(En F) u(p)(FIE) := u(E) . 
Let v(FIE) := p(FIE)u(FIE); we say that VE(F) := 
v(FIE) is the conditional value of F given E. Notice 
that { VE }eEA-{0} is a conditional probability system. 
Moreover, for any nonempty conditioning event E and 
for any F whose conditional probability is nonzero, 
v(FIE) u(FIE) = p(FIE) . 
Hence, in such cases we can regard the conditional 
expected utility as the ratio of two conditional prob­
abilities, one representing value and the other be­
lief. Note that, even when the probability of F given 
E is equal to zero, the conditional expected utility 
u(p)(E n F)/u(p)(E) is well defined and strictly posi­
tive. 
4.1 Existence of equilibrium in game 
networks 
Let G be a game network characterized by a finite 
set X = {Xk}kEN of decision nodes and their asso­
ciated probability (directed ) and utility (undirected ) 
arcs, and let ui : X ---+ IR+ be the utility function for 
player i (i E I) . For each k E N, let i(k) denote the 
player responsible for the choice of Xk. Let � be the 
set of all conditional probability systems {PH} on X 
where His an information set XPP(k) for some kEN, 
and PP(k) are the probability parents of k. Then the 
probability of any state x can be obtained by means of 
the simple product rule p(x) = xkENP(Xk lxPP(k) ). No­
tice that � is a compact subset of !Rn (where n is the 
number of parameters p(xkiXPP(k)) which character­
ize p), and is also convex with respect to combinations 
p>..p' defined by 
p)..p'(xkiXPP(k)) = Ap(xk lxPP(k))+(1-A.)p'(xk lxPP(k)), 
fork EN, ).. E [0, 1]. 
Next, let v : � ---+ � be a function which associates 
to each p E � a conditional probability system { v H} , 
where H = XPP(k) are the information sets, and 
Then v is a continuous self-function on a convex and 
compact subset of !Rn, and hence it has a fixed point by 
Brouwer's theorem. A fixed point is characterized by 
the set of equalities p(xklxPP(k)) = v(p)(xklxPP(k)), 
for all k, x k and x p P( k). Let F be the set of such fixed 
points. 
A Nash equilibrium is defined as a conditional proba­
bility system p E � such that 
for all k E N, xPP(k) and q E �- The set of Nash 
equilibria E is contained in F, as equilibrium probabil­
ities satisfy the fixed point conditions p(xkixPP(k)) = 
v(p)(xkiXPP(k))· This is an immediate consequence of 
the following result. 
Proposition 3 p is a Nash equilibrium if and only if 
1. ui(k)(p)(xkixPP(k)):::; 1, and 
2. Ui(k)(p)(xkiXPP(k)) = 1 ifp(xkiXPP(k)) > 0. 
How do we know that the set of Nash equilibria is 
nonempty? It is easy to check that Nash equilibria 
in G nets correspond to Nash equilibria in the agent­
strategic form [FT91, p.354], and hence an equilibrium 
exists by Nash's theorem. Yet, we present a simple 
direct proof, which motivates the convergence method 
we define later on. 
Let fe : � ---+ � be the function defined by f := uv = 
cz + (1 - c)v, where z is the conditional probability 
system which assigns equal probability to all the avail­
able actions at each information set. Brouwer's theo­
rem guarantees that the set of fixed points of fe is not 
empty. F ixed points of fe have an important property: 
Proposition 4 If p is a fixed point of fe, then 
ui(k)(p)(xklxPP(k)) > ui(k)(p)(x�lxPP(k)) implies 
p(xkiXPP(k)) > p(xkiXPP(k)). 
We define a robust equilibrium as a limit point of a 
sequence of fixed points of fe, as c goes to zero. By 
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compactness of D. any such sequence has a limit point, 
and hence the set of robust equilibria is nonempty. 
Since a robust equilibrium always exists, the following 
result ensures that the set of Nash equilibria is not 
empty. 
Proposition 5 Any robust equilibrium zs a Nash 
equilibrium. 
In fact, a stronger result holds: robust equilibria are 
also perfect, as they are easily shown to satisfy Defi­
nition 8.5C in [F T91, p.352 ]. 
Robust equilibria are similar to proper equilibria 
[Mye78 ], in that they are limits of sequences of strictly 
positive measures such that strategies with higher util­
ities always have higher probabilities. 
4.2 Global convergence to equilibrium in 
game networks 
Let { ui} iEI be the utility functions in a G net. We saw that an equilibrium is a conditional probability 
system p which satisfies F(p) = 0, where F(p) is the 
vector of functions defined by 
F(p)(xkiXPP(k)) = p(xkiXPP(k))- v(p)(xkiXPP(k)), and 
Ui(k) (p)(xk, XPP(k)) 
v(p)(xkiXPP(k)) = p(xkiXPP(k)) i(k)( )( ) · U P XPP(k) 
We study convergence to a zero of the vector F under 
the assumption that the probability of an action in­
creases or decreases in proportion to its relative utility 
with respect to the other available actions. For now we 
shall ignore the fact that some fixed points may fail to 
be equilibria; in fact, we show below that the method 
we are presenting will converge to a Nash equilibrium 
in games with generic payoffs. 
Consider the perturbed problem 
F.,(p)(xkiXPP(k)) = p(xkiXPP(k))- f .,(p)(xkixPP(k)) · 
Observe that F., can be rewritten as cF0(p) + (1 -
c)F(p), where F(p) is the target system whose ze­
ros we want to find and F0(p) is the trivial system 
( p(xkixPP(k))- z(xkixPP(k) )xk>xPP(kJ, whose unique 
solution is p = z. Then F., defines a convex-linear ho­
motopy h(p, t) = F1_t [Mor87, p.135 ] with parameter 
t E [0, 1 ]. Note that h coincides with the trivial system 
for t = 0, and with the target system for t = 1. 
In our setting h is extremely well behaved: for generic 
payoffs it satisfies conditions 1,2,3 and 4b in [Mor87, 
p.122 ] by construction, and moreover it satisfies condi-
tion 5 (in !Rn) because F is bounded. Therefore, stan­
dard path-tracking methods are guaranteed to work 
for generic games. The end point of the homotopy path 
is a robust equilibrium, as it is the limit, as c goes to 
zero, of a sequence of solutions for the perturbed prob­
lem. To handle degenerate cases, in which the uniform 
distribution is a bad choice of initial condition, it suf­
fices to introduce a slight random perturbation to the 
game payoffs to guarantee convergence. 
Now we can define a new solution concept (the end 
point of the homotopy path ), which we name first equi­
librium, and claim that: 
• a generic G net has a unique first equilibrium 
• the first equilibrium is uniquely determined by the 
payoff structure of the game 
• the first equilibrium of a generic G net can be ap­
proximated using standard path-tracking meth­
ods 
• the first equilibrium is a robust equilibrium of the 
game. 
How does the above procedure compare with the ex­
isting game-theoretic methods for computing a sample 
equilibrium? The literature on computational meth­
ods in game theory is quite technical, and we shall 
not attempt an explicit comparison here; for a sur­
vey on the recent state of the art we refer to [M M96]. 
The main advantage of our approach with respect to 
other methods is that, for given (xk, XpP(k)), strate­
gically independent variables do not affect the values 
of F(p)(xkixPP(k)) ;  it follows that, in the presence of 
strategic independencies, convergence to the zeros of 
a large system can be reduced to convergence to the 
zeros of smaller, strategically independent subsystems. 
The following example illustrates the point for a simple 
case. 
Example 2 Suppose that there is only one agent, and 
let A and B be two strategically independent subsets 
of variables with marginal probability functions Pa and 
Pb respectively. Then p = Pa x Pb, and F(p) (a) and 
can be written as Pa (1 - w a l,��) ) , while a sim-
a' W a 0 Pa' 
ilar expression holds for F(p)(b) . Note that F(p)(a) 
(resp., F(p)(b)) is a function of Pa (resp., Pb) only, 
and hence the zeros of F(p) correspond to the zeros 
of the two independent subsystems FA(Pa) := F(p)(a) 
and FB(Pb) := F(p)(b). 
4.3 Computing all the equilibria 
The convergence method we presented above only 
tracks a single robust equilibrium. Yet, in many cases 
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one wants a complete list of all the Nash equilibria. For 
instance, we may want to design agents who always 
coordinate on a Pareto efficient equilibrium, whenever 
such efficient equilibrium is unique. How would our 
agents know if that condition is met? In principle, 
they will need to identify all the equilibria in order to 
infer their optimal strategies. 
Finding all equilibria is computationally very demand­
ing. As in the single-equilibrium case, we seek a 
method which can take advantage of strategic inde­
pendencies in order to simplify computations. It turns 
out that an adaptation of the procedure defined in sec­
tion 4.2 can be put to such use. 
Let G(p) be the vector of functions (gJ)jEJ (where 
j = (xk, XPF(k))) defined by G(p)(xkixPF(k)) = 
ui(k) (p)(xPF(k))F(p)(xk lxPF(k))· Since u is strictly 
positive and bounded, the zeros of G coincide with 
the zeros of F. 
Notice that both the numerator and the denomina­
tor of v(p)(xkiXPF(k)) are polynomial functions of the 
p(xkiXPF(k) ), and hence G(p) is a vector of polynomial 
functions, whose zeros include all the Nash equilibria. 
Also, observe that strategically independent variables 
do not affect the zeros of G(p)(xklxPF(k)); they only 
play the role of multiplicative scaling factors. As in 
the single-equilibrium case, in the presence of strate­
gic independencies we can replace a large system of 
polynomial equations with smaller, strategically inde­
pendent subsystems, as the following example shows 
for a simple case. 
Example 3 As in example 2 assume that there is a 
single agent, and two strategically independent subsets 
of variables A and B. Then G(p)(a) can be writ­
ten as Pa [La' w(a'lbo)Pa' - w(albo)] (Lb w(blao)Pb) ,  
while a similar expression holds for G(p)(b). Observe 
that the last term in the product is strictly positive, and 
hence the zeros of G(pa, Pb) correspond to the zeros of 
the two independent subsystems G A (Pa) and G B (Pb), 
where GA(Pa)(a) := Pa [La' w(a'lbo)Pa'- w(albo)], 
and GB(Pb)(b) := Pb [Lb' w(b'lao)Pb'- w(blao)]. 
A Nash equilibrium may not have any homotopy path 
converging to it in !Rn. Yet, the following result ensures 
that we can get at them in the complex space en. Let 
G0 be the initial system defined by 
0( d· d· d· Gj p) = D/P/ - !3/' 
where j (xk, XPF(k)), dj is the degree of 
G(p)(xkiXPF(k)), and aj and f3J are generic complex 
constants. Then G0(p) = 0 has d = XjEJdj solutions. 
Let h(x, t) be the homotopy defined by 
Then the following result in [Mor87, p. 60 ] applies. 
Theorem 6 Given G, there are sets of measure zero, 
Aa and As in en such that, if a � Aa and {3 � At3, 
then: 
1. the solution set {(p, t) E en X [0, 1 ) : h(p, t) = 0 } 
is a collection of d non-overlapping (smooth} paths 
2. the paths move from t = 0 to t = 1 without back­
tracking in t 
3. each geometrically isolated solution of G = 0 of 
multiplicity m has exactly m continuation paths 
converging to it. 
Theorem 6 guarantees that the homotopy paths gen­
erated by h are well-behaved, and can be tracked 
with standard computational techniques. Observe 
that this method will identify all the zeros of G, in­
cluding those which are not Nash equilibria; yet, the 
latter are easily singled out, as they correspond to 
the real solutions which lie in the region delimited by 
ui(k)(p)(xkiXPF(k)) � 1. 
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